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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims and Questions in issue 
 
The role of environmental protection has grown over the last decades, nationally as well as 
globally. Environmental damage and exploitation are a large concern for today’s society and 
this can be seen in the increased amount of conventions on the area. Despite this, 
environmental legislation is when compared to other laws relatively new and it is not always 
given the space it needs. Competition law is for example, considered as very important and 
the question is whether environmental considerations can even uphold themselves with such 
areas.  
 
There has always been a tension between competition and environmental protection but it 
came to the fore with the arrival of the environmental agreement1 as a policy instrument and 
the never-ending governmental aid given for environmental purposes. This development gave 
rise to questions such as how EC competition law should react to environmental agreements 
that protects the environment but restricts competition, or how the prohibition of state aid in 
Article 87 of the EC Treaty is to be applied to cases where such aids are granted for 
environmental purposes even though it distorts competition.2 These problems are not easy to 
solve, but integration is nevertheless required according to Article 6 of the EC Treaty.  
 
Competition is often seen as bad for environmental protection, but is it really that simple? We 
cannot ignore the fact that competition is a very powerful driving force which makes and have 
made economies endeavour for better solutions in order to make profits. New technology, or 
lower costs for environmental protection is appreciated and sometimes also necessary for the 
implementation of environmental legislation. The Kyoto protocol is a good example of this 
complex of interrelated problems. This convention was rejected by the US basically because 
of the costs involved and the costs on the competition situation. With a good integration of 
competition and environmental protection, problems like those might be solved.  
 
                                                          
1 An environmental agreement is an agreement between different companies or between a group of companies 
and a public authority on an environmental matter. 
2 Vedder, Hans: Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe; Towards Substainability?, Europa 
Law Publishing, Groningen 2003, pp. 3-4. (henceforth referred to as Vedder) 
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The aim of this dissertation is to discuss the integration of environmental concerns and 
competition in the area of state aid in the EC regulation. I will also consider whether or not 
the integration which has developed, is the best possible for both areas.  
 
 
1.2 Outline, delimitation and method 
 
The integration of environmental concerns and EC competition law is an interesting area of 
law, which has been the subject of considerable changes over the last couple of years. It 
would have been engaging to penetrate the entire EC competition regulation for this 
discussion, but this dissertation will have its emphasis on the State Aid regulation in Article 
87-89 of the EC Treaty. Dominant position, concerted practices etc. are areas of competition 
law which are well-known and it is therefore I have chosen to concentrate on the relatively 
unexplored State Aid regulation. 
   
I will in the introductory chapter discuss the subject of integration, which will be directed by 
Article 6 of the EC Treaty, as well as case law in the area. This will be followed by a broad 
summery of the theory of competition, in order to give a background to the position it has and 
has had in our society. Chapter 3 will furthermore look into the role of environmental 
protection and its development. I will thereafter describe the complex of problems considering 
state aid and environmental protection. A report of the state aid regulation in Article 87 of the 
EC Treaty will thereafter be given in chapter 5 and 6. Chapter 7 will deal with the Community 
Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, the dissertation will finally end with an 
analysis in chapter 8. The problems in the area will furthermore be exemplified through the 
whole dissertation by the Swedish energy taxation scheme. 
 
 




Article 3 of the EC Treaty states that the activities of the Community shall aim to comply with 
the purposes set out in Article 2, i.e. the promotion of substantial and non-inflationary growth 
and a high level of protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment. It is 
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furthermore held that the Community shall have a policy in the sphere of environment 
protection, Article 3(l), as well as “a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is 
not distorted”, Article 3(h). The question is how and why these totally different aims are 
supposed to integrate with each other. I will in the following text describe the integration 
principle in Article 6 of the EC Treaty and if it’s ambiguous. I will furthermore give examples 
of how conflicts have been dealt with in practice.  
 
 
2.2 The integration – Article 6 and case-law 
 
“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development.” 
 
This integration principle which can be found in Article 6 of the EC Treaty, was introduced 
into the Treaty by the Single European Act 1987. It has become more forceful during the 
years and is today regarded as one of the most important principles of EC law. But what does 
the principle mean for the Community’s environmental protection and why is it important? 
 
The integration principle has created a legally binding obligation for the Community 
institutions to integrate environmental considerations into other Community areas. 
Environmental concerns must, with other words, be taken into account and that means 
furthermore that respect must be given to environmental protection. It is, however, difficult to 
know what is to be integrated. The Treaty refers to “environmental protection requirements”, 
but there is no definition of that concept. It does furthermore not explain how to do with 
conflicting policies, nor if one policy area have priority before another.3  
 
Despite all the ambiguity due to the wording, the aim of the Article is indisputable: To reach 
sustainable development. This can only be achieved, according to Hans Vedder, when both 
economic development as well as environmental considerations is satisfied.4 As Vedder put it:    
 
                                                          
3 Jans, J. H: European Environmental Law, volume 2, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen August 2000, pp. 17-
18. (henceforth referred to as Jans)  
4 Jans, pp. 17-18, Vedder, pp. 13-16. 
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“Sustainable development does not mean a return to the early hominid way of life even 
though that will undoubtedly mean less environmental degradation. The other extreme, 
unmitigated economic growth and financial profit, certainly also falls outside the scope of 
sustainable development. Sustainable development is all about finding a modus vivendi for 
economic growth and environmental protection.”5 
 
The significance of the integration principle can be questioned, but it has nevertheless made a 
difference. It forces the Community institutions to take the environment into account when 
making decisions, also in regard to competition regulations. The aim in this complex of 
problems is simply, to find a balanced relationship between economic growth and 
environmental protection. This has for example been done by the ECJ in the ADBHU6 case 
where Community legislation for the protection of the environment resulted in trade 
restrictions. The Court used the principle of proportionality to resolve these problems with 
conflicting policies and found that this kind of restriction of trade was acceptable, as long as 
the measures were not discriminatory and did not entail restrictions that went beyond what 
was strictly necessary for the protection of the environment.7 
   
 




Governments normally accomplish protection of the environment by using legislation, 
information, economic or market based tools. These actions normally mean extra costs i.e. 
other costs then production costs. If a plant has to install an extra filter in order to meet new 
and more stringent governmental emission standards, they will have to pay for what they 
consider - extra expenses. These costs will therefore be incorporated in the products and have 
an effect on the competitive situation on a market. Hence, there is a connection between 
competition and environmental law and policy. This relationship can also lead to a connection 
between competition law and policy on the one hand and the environmental law and policy on 
the other. That is for example the situation when a government grants subsidies in order to 
                                                          
5 Vedder, p. 14. 
6 Case 240/83, ADBHU [1985] ECR 531. 
7 Jans, pp. 19-23, Vedder pp. 13-19. 
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compensate the industry for the extra costs resulting from environmental regulation. Such aid 
will most probably fall under the prohibition of State Aid in Article 87 of the EC Treaty, but 
the aid might also be necessary for the environmental protection and to maintain international 
competition.8  
 
The next chapter will discuss the theory of competition in order to give a background to the 
competition law and policy, which is of current interest in the EC. The role of environmental 
protection in the market theory will be discussed, along with an overview of the different 
approaches to environmental protection which exists today will be given. 
 
 
3.2 Free competition  
 
What is free competition? Adam Smith, an economist and philosopher who lived between 
1723 and 1790, laid down the intellectual framework that explained the free market.9 He was 
the first to describe the competitive process and to envisage that a market would function 
optimally if there were free competition. Stigler, another economist, distinguished five 
prerequisites for this concept, videlicet:  
 
- Independent behaviour of competitors. 
- A sufficiently large number of competitors so as to eliminate extraordinary profits. 
- Economic entities must have sufficient knowledge of the market. 
- Freedom from social pressure so that this knowledge can be followed without 
compromise. 
- Sufficient time for production factors to re-allocate.10  
   
Smith and Stigler may call this free competition, other economists have also referred to this 
situation as perfect competition. The foundation is nevertheless the same. A perfect/free 
market is achieved when all competitors are on the same competitive level. This is meant to 
be when economic resources are allocated between different goods and services in a way 
which give everyone the same opportunity. A producer will in that circumstance expand his 
                                                          
8 Vedder, p. 45. 
9 More about Adam Smith see Lucidcafé's Library http://www.lucidcafe.com/library/96jun/smith.html 2004-04-
25 
10 Vedder, pp. 21-22. 
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production for as long as it is privately profitable to do so, this also means that consumers can 
obtain the goods or services at the lowest price where supply equals demand. As a result the 
products will be produced at the lowest costs possible, since the producer in a market of 
perfect competition can not sell for a higher price. A price will simply never rise above cost. 
A further benefit of competition, according to these theories, is that it is thought to encourage 
producers to constantly innovate and develop new products as part of striving for the 
consumers.11 
 
Perfect/free competition does however not exist. Smith envisaged the problems which could 
hinder free competition from fully functioning or existing in the first place, primarily for two 
reasons. Firstly, governmental policy could stand in the way of free competition and secondly, 
individuals behaviour on the market.12    
 
 
3.3 The role of Environmental protection in the market theory 
 
There are many different doctrines and schools of thought which discuss the concept of 
competition, but there is nevertheless not one definition that is universally accepted. The US 
competition authorities for instance rely on economic welfare as the ultimate objective of 
competition policy, they are therefore less strict with larger companies because of the 
economies of scale that are possible in such enterprises, whereas the European Commission is 
more concerned with maintaining competition itself. Whatever the concept includes, the main 
point is to ensure welfare. The question, however, is how to handle areas of the economy 
where competition does not achieve optimal results. The truth is, despite what the theories 
claim, that the free market can not itself deal with all the problems a society gives rise to. 
Natural monopolies are one of these problems and negative externality another.13 
 
Environmental damage is a negative externality, i.e. a cost which is not borne by the original 
parties to a transaction. E.g. you buy a pen and the chemicals from the factory flow into the 
river next to someone’s house causing him or her to suffer ‘private negative externality’ and 
damaging water quality for everyone, ‘social negative externality’. The result of conduct to 
                                                          
11 Whish, R: Competition Law, Fourth edition”, The Bath Press, Bath 2001, pp. 1-5 (henceforth referred to as 
Whish) and Vedder, pp. 20-23. 
12 Vedder, pp. 21-25. 
13 Vedder, pp. 38-40. 
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prevent this negative externality is, however, not visible. A consumer who buys 
environmental friendly products can for example not see the direct result of his conduct in the 
environment nor can the company which recycles. It is therefore hard to encourage them to 
behave in an environmentally friendly way. These costs can be on the other hand be 
internalised, i.e. make the original parties to the transaction pay for them. Whether this would 
be good for competition or not depends on the cost to competition. It would for example 
maybe be cheaper to set up public water cleaning stations which are more cost effective than 
every factory having one.14  
 
Recycling is for example one of the areas of environmental protection which involve large 
sunk costs, due to the large collection network for used products required for the activity. 
These large costs cannot be covered by a single company, they are therefore normally covered 
by organisations that tend to have the properties of a monopoly and monopolies restrain 
competition. Many consumers are furthermore not willing to pay the extra cost which 
environmental protection involves and one free rider15 could stop the parties from protecting 
the environment. The obvious solution to the free rider problem would be to set up a 
controlling mechanism. This controlling mechanism may though itself have some anti-
competitive effects. A possibility to solve these problems is to internalise the costs in the 
product from the beginning and competition can in that case be achieved even in the aspect of 
environmental protection. 16    
 
 
3.4 The development of Environmental Protection       
 
European environmental law has been at the centre of significant change over the past 
decades. It has gone from being a minor aspect in the Community to becoming one of its 
fundamental cornerstones. The knowledge gained from the development of the European 
environmental laws is therefore of great importance in order to understand the principles, 
reasons and measures used for environmental protection today.  
 
 
                                                          
14 Vedder, pp. 37-38. 
15 A free rider is an economic actor who benefits from a (collective) good without paying for it. 
16 Vedder, pp. 38-40. 
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3.4.1 The regulatory approach 
 
Environmental problems were basically not seen as significant at the time of the Community’s 
establishment. The first environmental phase started as late as the entry into force of the 
original version of the EEC Treaty 1958 and continued until 1972. There was no legislation 
particularly for the protection of the environment during this time, but despite this there were 
decisions which protected the environment. The aim of those decisions was, however, not to 
protect the environment, they were actually made incidentally due to the accomplishment of 
the common market. There were for example, Directive 67/54817 related to the classification, 
packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations and Directive 70/15718  related to the 
permissible sound level and the exhaust system of motor vehicles. It was during the 
preparation of the UN Conference of the “Human Environment”19 that the Community’s view 
of environmental problems changed. The participating countries of the Conference agreed to 
work towards an improved quality and standard of life where non-material values were taken 
into consideration. It was under these circumstances the Union realised that it was necessary 
to draw up guidelines for an environmental action program within the Community. The real 
starting point for Community environmental legislation can therefore be said to have come 
first from the Conference 1972. The first environmental action program emerged 1973 as a 
product of this conference and lasted until 1976. It came to draw up the fundamental 
principles for the Unions environmental policy. The use of environmental action programs is 
still in use, and the Community has since the first one adopted another five action programs.20 
 
“Environmental protection” was a term which was not expressly mentioned in the days of the 
EEC Treaty. It came despite of this, to be included in the aim of Article 2 EEC Treaty and 
subject to the Community’s decision-making. The background to this development can be 
found in the wording of the first environmental action program. It held that environmental 
protection could become the subject of Community decision-making by an extensive 
interpretation of “economic expansion”, which is expressly included as an aim in Article 2 of 
the old EEC Treaty. At this time the EEC Treaty lacked a legal basis for the Community to 
handle questions concerning the environment, it did not have any competence in that area. 
                                                          
17 OJ 1967 L 196/I, amended many times since then. 
18 OJ 1971 L 42, later amended. 
19 U.N. Document A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. 1, report of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, 
held at Stockholm June 5-16, 1972. 
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Directives and regulations were nevertheless adopted during this time through Article 100 and 
23521, but there were no Community legislation that solely protected the environment. Article 
100 permitted environmental measures which had to be taken due to a proper functioning of 
the common market, but more far-reaching environmental measures could not be taken under 
this provision. Article 235 on the other hand was used and can still be used as a “catch-all” 
provision. The article gives the Community the right to take action even if the Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers, if the measure is necessary in order to attain the course of the 
operation of the common market and the Community objectives.22   
 
In this period of development, environmental protection has mostly been achieved through the 
“command and control” instruments. Regulation has been the most important tool to protect 
the environment, but it has also given implications on the level of the application of 
competition law and affected competition itself. The benefit of using regulatory instruments 
is, however, shown to be limited.23 
 
 
3.4.2 Towards market-based instruments 
 
The Community’s environmental policy was in the 1970s and early 1980s mainly concerned 
with setting and implementing standards for the main parameters of the environment, but it 
did move from a narrow view of considering environmental protection as only restriction of 
pollution, to also see the prevention of pollution and the integration of environmental policy 
in other policies of the Community, as environmental protection24 The next phase of the 
Community’s environmental policy came with the SEA 1987. For the first time, objectives of 
the Community’s environmental policy were enclosed in the Treaty and articles for the 
protection of the environment emerged. Article 130r, 130s, 130t, 100a(3) and 100a(4)25 were 
all specially designed provisions for this purpose. The polluter pays principle26 was confirmed 
in the new provisions, but its meaning came to have a larger influence on the Community 
legislated then only as a principle that affected the areas the environmental articles protected. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
20Jans, p. 3 and Mahmoudi, S: EU:s miljörätt, second edition, Nordstedts Juridik AB, Stockholm 2003 
(henceforth Mahmoudi), pp. 37-39. 
21 Now Article 94 and 308. 
22 Jans, pp. 3-7. 
23 Vedder, pp. 45-47. 
24 Mahmoudi, pp. 40-41. 
25 Now Articles 174, 175, 176, 95(3) and 95(4) EC Treaty. 
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It called for the integration of the requirements of environmental protection to be included in 
the definition and implementation of the Community’s other polices, and it stressed the need 
for prevention.27 The use of Article 100 and 235 were through the significant change in this 
environmental phase, seldom used for environmental purposes after this. Article 235 is 
nevertheless still used in exceptional cases when there are no other legal possibilities to base 
environmental measures on.28  
 
The fifth environmental action program was adopted almost a year after the introduction of 
the Maastricht Treaty 1993. It was heavily influenced by the improvements of the Treaty and 
did therefore introduce many new ways of attacking environmental problems. The main aim 
was to go towards a sustainable development, i.e. that the economic development in the 
Community should take place in relation to the environment. In practice this means an 
optimal use of recycling and reuse in order to prevent natural resources to exhaust. The list of 
the content of the fifth program can be made very long, but among the aims worth mentioning 
are: integration of environmental consideration in other policies, wider range of economic and 
market tools, enforcement and use of the legislation, increased awareness and international 
co-operation, sustainable production- and consumption patterns, shared responsibility and 
partnership as well as the promotion of local and regional initiatives. 29  The fifth 
environmental action program “Towards Sustainability” ended on the 31st of December 2000 
and was followed up by the sixth environmental action program which has been planned for 
the period of 2001-2010. This environmental action program also recognises the importance 
of using market-based tools.30 
 
This change acknowledges that the traditional approach, based almost exclusively on 
regulation and particularly standards, has not been fully satisfactory. The command and 
control regulation focused on curing the degeneration of the environment by imposing certain 
behaviour on the actors. The effectiveness of these kinds of instruments is lower than that of 
instruments that actively involve private actors, since it lack incentive for the companies to go 
beyond what has been prescribed. Market based instruments are on the other hand generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 The polluter pays principle will be explained in chapter 3.4.3. 
27 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection OJ 1994 C 72/03 (henceforth referred to as 
1994 Guidelines) 
28 Jans, p.7. 
29 Mahamoudi, pp. 41-44 and OJ 1994 C 72/03. 
30 The sixth environmental action program, ”Our Future - Our Choice,  Brussels KOM(2001)31  2001/0029 
(COD). 
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considered to be better, since they use the companies knowledge of where to achieve a given 
environmental improvement at the lowest costs. The aim of introducing the new instruments 
was simply to increase the flexibility to achieve the desired environmental objectives in a 
certain situation. This shift in environmental policy from command and control to more 
market-based instruments can therefore be said to be the result of the wish to internalise 
external costs.31  
 
 
3.4.3 The polluter pays principle  
 
The OECD was the first to endorse the polluter pays principle. The principle created in the 
1970s, necessitated that the polluter should carry the cost of pollution caused in production or 
consumption. The purpose was simply to internalise the economic cost of environmental 
damage in the products – meaning that the polluter have to bear the full cost to meet 
environmental regulations and standards. The principle is created for the economic purpose to 
ensure an optimal allocation of means of production and to achieve a maximum value of 
production.32   
 
The polluter pays principle is one of the cornerstones of Community environmental policy. It 
was important for the Unions environmental concerns even before it was incorporated into the 
Treaty. The aim of the polluter pays principle is, of course, to make the polluter pay, but also 
to encourage polluters to reduce pollution and endeavour to find less polluting products or 
technologies. This is done in practice by imposing environmental charges for production that 
has negative effects on the environment.33  
 
Environmental costs can be internalised at a number of different levels. One possibility would 
be to internalise environmental costs at the moment of disposal. This would for example mean 
that the consumer has to pay a sort of waste tax when dumping. Another possibility would be 
to internalise these costs at the production or pre-production stage, as for example as a raw 
                                                          
31 Vedder, pp. 47-49 and Mahmoudi, pp. 42-44. 
32 Humphreys, M. (2001) The Polluter Pays Principle in Transport Policy. The European Law Review, 26(5), pp. 
451-467. (henceforth referred to as Humphreys);  Birnie, P. W. and Boyle, A. E.: International Law and The 
Environment, Cornwall: T.J. International Ltd 2002, pp.92-95. (henceforth referred to as Birnie) and Lefeber, R.: 
Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International 1996, pp. 1-4. (henceforth referred to as Lefeber) 
33 Jans, pp. 37-39. 
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material tax. Both methods could lead to negative effects, such as the consumer dumping the 
waste illegally or the process to be too costly for the producers. The aim is, however, that 
through charges or other market initiatives to guide producers to choose a more environmental 
friendly way of production. The optimal would be to use the producers’ knowledge with 
regard to the methods of production, the product itself and the methods of recycling to find 
this way.34  
 
The Swedish Government introduced an energy- and carbon dioxide tax system for just this 
purpose - to guide producers to choose a more environmental friendly way of production. 
Evaluations from this initiative have shown that it has strongly contributed to the reduction of 
greenhouse gases. Sweden’s third national report about climate change estimated the 
discharge 2010 to be 15-20 per cent lower by using this system compared to the system used 
1990. That corresponds to approximately 10 million ton carbon dioxide. The problem is that 
the competition is affected when no harmonised tax rate for carbon dioxide exists in the EC 
today. Aid where, however, given as tax relief to some sectors of the Swedish industry in 
order to maintain competition on the international market. 35  A measure which actually 
decreases the effectiveness of the tax system and is against the aim of the polluter pays 
principle. Finally, the polluter pays principle means in practical terms simply that 
environmental protection should not depend on aid schemes or place the burden of fighting 
pollution on the society.36  
 
 




Aid raises interesting questions regarding both environmental and competition policy. There 
is a strong connection between the wish to minimise the interference in the market economy 
and the development of the environmental principle, which states that the polluter should pay. 
The existing environmental policy tries as far as possible to integrate the environmental 
protection costs in the product. There are nevertheless circumstances where it is not possible 
                                                          
34 Vedder, p. 11 
35 The Swedish energy taxation scheme will be further discussed in chapter 4.3. 
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to fully integrate the costs, and aid of temporary nature can therefore be given in order to 
facilitate the undertakings adaptation to standards. This has been taken into account in the 
State aid regulation which through the application and guidelines for Article 87(3)(c) permits 
certain environmental aid. There are, however, also other areas of the State aid regulation 
which covers environmental aid. These areas are for example, aid to promote cultural and 
heritage conservation, aid to restore the nature after disasters, aid of common European 
interest etc.37 
 
The question is how to give aid in a way that gives positive benefits to both competition and 
environmental protection. It is furthermore important to remember that aid is actually not 
always to the benefit of the environmental protection, it can in fact in some cases have 
harmful effects. The purpose is therefore in the following text to see how aid can work as an 
incentive for firms to improve standards or to make further investments to reduce pollution 
from their plants, without interfering too much with competition.38 
 
 
4.2 The purpose of aid 
 
Aid has for a long time been utilised as an important environmental tool due to many different 
reasons. Governments use either sticks or carrots to change firms’ behaviour. Sticks are for 
example more stringent regulation. These kinds of changes are, however, normally met with 
objections from firms. Carrots on the other hand, videlicet subsidies are more acceptable. 
Even though the result of both measures can turn out to be the same governments tend to use 
the latter in order to have the companies on their side. This goes hand in hand with the fact 
that producers are normally politically well organised and they therefore have both the 
intention and the power to influence the policy-making process.39  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
36 Remiss av Skattenedsättningskommitténs betänkande “Svåra skatter” (SOU 2003:38) Dnr Fi2003/2414 and 
Jans, pp. 37-39. 
37 Vedder, pp. 20-25; Gandy, Matthew: Recycling and Waste, 1st edition, Awebury Ashgate Publishing, London 
1993, p. 25 (henceforth referred to as Gandy); Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection 
OJ 2001 C 37/03 (henceforth referred to as 2001 Guidelines; Speech by Jean-Francoias Pons, Vice president of 
the Competition authority, Madrid 20th September 2001 and Article 87 EC.  
38 2001 Guidelines. 
39 Kim, H, (2000) “Subsidy, Polluter Pays Principle and Financial Assistance among Countires”, Journal of 
World Trade, 34(6), pp. 115-141. (henceforth referred to as Kim) 
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The benefits of aid are that it can sometimes deal with encouraging production which gives 
rise to external benefit. One example is environmental aid given to the production of energy 
from renewable sources. The use of these sources, for example biomass which is an organic 
matter and includes material such as wood, plants and animal waste, emit carbon dioxide 
when they are combusted. Emissions that would have been emitted even if the tree was not 
used as fuel but decomposed. Use of fossil fuels is on the other hand increasing the total 
amount of carbon in the atmosphere, which would not have been emitted if the fuel was not 
used.40 
 
At the same time this kind of aid can, according to Kim, be negative for the environment. 
Such subsidy generally includes environmental control costs, i.e. the cost of firms reducing 
pollution, such as installing and operating pollution reduction facilities, changing progress or 
raw materials and would therefore only encourage firms to be environmental friendly up to 
the level where the firm’s abatement costs are equal to the subsidy. The firm will not be 
influenced to constantly reduce pollution to decrease the cost of the tax.41  
 
 
4.3 The Swedish energy taxation scheme 
 
It is important to remember that aid can also be given for measures which are negative for the 
environment. As mentioned earlier, some parts of the Swedish industry are favoured by a 
degree of relief from the carbon dioxide tax, a total relief of fossil fuels tax and electricity tax 
existing in Sweden. Different tax rates are used depending on which sector a company 
belongs to.  The industry is at present dived into three sectors: 
 
- Industry sector, i.e. agriculture, forestry, manufacturing industry, green house 
nourishment, water mill, mine industry and mineral extraction. 
- Energy sector, i.e. electricity, gas, heat and water supply. 
- Remaining sector, i.e. building activity, public service, transport and other services. 
 
                                                          
40 Motion till riksdagen 2003/04:mp009 ML av Ingegerd Saarinen (mp) med anledning av prop. 2003/04:42 Torv 
och elcertifikat. 
41 Kim, pp. 115-141. 
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The differentiation has resulted in the “remaining sector” paying 100 per cent of the carbon 
dioxide tax, whereas the “industry sector” is only liable for 25 per cent. In addition the 0,8 per 
cent rule, which is applicable to the entire industry sector, states that a further reduction is 
given for the part of the tax that exceeds 0,8 per cent of the selling value. That means that 
only 24 per cent is paid for the surplus. Then there is the 1,2 per cent rule which is only 
applicable for some industries, i.e. the manufactures of other mineral substances then metals. 
These companies are not paying any carbon dioxide tax for the part of the tax which exceed 
1,2 per cent of the selling value. In regard to the fossil fuels and electricity taxation all sectors 
except the manufacturing industry is liable; they are on the other hand totally exempt from the 
tax. This differentiated tax system has been accepted for a period of time but the opinion of its 
justification has changed with the Adria-Wien case42. The ECJ simply stated that it is state aid 
to pick out certain sectors of the industry and to give them tax benefits. The Commission is 
also unwilling to authorise all these measures under Article 87(3)(c).43 
 
 




State aid poses a threat to the Community interest of a system of undistorted competition and 
interferes with the functioning of the single market, Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty. The fear is 
that State aid can create a market where products are no longer manufactured where 
conditions are most favourable, but where the company can receive the highest amount of aid. 
That would among other things create a situation where products no longer compete under the 
same conditions and restrain the free movement of goods. The Community therefore finds 
that there is a need to scrutinise aid.44   
 
Even if State aid can hinder competition in the Community, it is nevertheless a vital 
instrument of economic and social policy for the Member States. They can use these 
instruments to influence the economic health of a region or whole sectors of the economy, 
                                                          
42 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH, Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v. 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, REG 2001 s. I-8365.  
43 SOU:38 pp. 19-21. 
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especially in times of economic difficulty and high unemployment. State aid is therefore a 






Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits any aid granted by a Member State which distorts 
competition by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States. The provisions of the article do therefore not cover non-profit-making activities of a 
charitable, social or cultural nature or Community aid granted by the EU itself.46  
 
Due to the derogations provided for in the Treaty or by the Council acting under powers 
granted by the Treaty, Articles 87(2) and 87(3) give an opportunity for the Member States to 
protect a number of legitimate economic and social goals. Article 87(2) lists categories of aid 
which is compatible with the common market and Article 87(3) lays down aids which may be 
compatible with the common market after an examination. Other categories of aid may be 




5.3 Components of Article 87(1) 
 
Article 87(1) does not, as I mentioned above, prohibit all State aid and I will therefore go 
through the four criteria which all need to be fulfilled to constitute unlawful aid. These are: 
 
- Aid granted by the State or through State resources 
- Distortion of competition 
- Support for particular undertakings or spheres of commercial activity 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
44 Beudenbacher, C: “A Brief Guide to European State Aid Law”, Kluwer Law International, Hague 1997, pp. 1-
4 (henceforth referred to as Beudenbacher) and Steiner, J and Woods, L: Textbook on EC Law, eight edition, 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, Gosport, Hants 2003, p. 280. (henceforth referred to as Steiner) 
45 Beudenbacher, pp. 1-4 and Steiner, p. 280. 
46 Beudenbacher, pp. 1-4 
 21
- Effect on trade between Member States 
 
 
5.3.1 The Concept of an “Aid” 
 
What is State aid? Article 87(1) contains a ban on any State aid which is incompatible with 
the common market, but the Treaty leaves the term undefined. This has on the other hand 
made it possible for the ECJ to interpret the term flexible and to bring it into line with social 
development. In an early ruling48 the ECJ had an opportunity in respect of Article 4(c) ECSC 
Treaty to define the terms aid and subsidy. Subsidies were considered as payments in money 
or in kind which are made to an undertaking for its support and which are outside the 
remuneration the undertakings receives from purchasers or users of the goods and services 
produced. Aid on the other hand was defined as a measure used to reduce charges normally 
borne by an undertaking. Despite this judgement there is no conclusive definition for the 
terms that have been agreed on so far. There is on the other hand a widespread conception that 
the notion of aid is more extensive than that of subsidy, since aid does not only cover positive 
benefits but also negative.49  
 
Positive benefits have been concluded to involve measures such as: any grant or advantage 
from the public authorities; certain unmarketlike advantages belonging to the state which 
improves the economic situation of the undertaking in comparison with other undertakings, 
the payment of a part or the whole cost of production by someone other than the purchaser; a 
benefit which the recipient would not otherwise have received “in the normal course”, or 
intervention which mitigate the charges which are normally borne by the undertakings 
themselves. Negative benefits on the other hand are for example exemption from charges, 
deduction from a tax debt or of an amount equivalent to a certain percentage of purchasing 
and production costs, preferential discount rates, sureties, the lump-sum of taxation of 
income, or extended possibilities of depreciation for certain investments. The definition of 
State aid is however broad and the list above is not exhaustive.50   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
47 Evans, A: “European Community Law of State Aid”, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, pp. 1-26 (henceforth 
referred to as Evans) and  Simon, S. (1999) “Recent developments in State aid policy”, European Economy, 
State Aid and the Single Market, 3, p. 46 (henceforth referred to as Simon) and Steiner, pp. 281-282. 
48 ECR 1961, p. 3 – De Gezamenlijke Steenkolemijnen in Limburg v. High Authority 
49 Simon, p. 46 and Beudenbacher, pp. 6-9. 
50 Evans, pp. 27-28 and Beudenbacher, pp. 6-8. 
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Despite the aspects written above the ECJ has still not fully defined the concept of aid. The 
court has according to Vedder consistently refused to do so and instead adopt an effect-based 
approach in the light of the objective of Article 87 and the objective is to attain and maintain a 
level playing field throughout the common market. The characteristic features of State aid are 
therefore in the Courts opinion its favouring effect, such as an improvement of the 
competitiveness of their industries compared to their competitors.51 This is stated in the Deufil 
case52:  
 
“Article 92 [Now Article 87] does not therefore distinguish between the measures of state 
intervention concerned by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation 
to their effects […]”. 
 
In the “Family Allowances in the Textile Sector” ruling 53  the ECJ rejected the Italian 
governments argument that the reduction of a relief was a question of social and fiscal nature 
and therefore not subject to the State aid provisions. The Court pointed out that Article 87(1) 
defines aid trough the effect of the measures concerned, not on the basis of its reason. The 
undertaking in the case did, despite the reason of the aid, benefit from an advantage and it was 
therefore unlawful. On the other hand, measures that cannot be seen as giving a preferential 
effect cannot fall under the prohibition of State aid. An examples of that is State measures 
such as support for public campaigns to increase environmental awareness and provide 
specific information about, for example, selective waste collection, conservation of natural 
resources or environmental friendly products. Aid for these kinds of purposes is normally too 
general and does therefore not benefit a particular undertaking or spheres of commercial 
activity. There is no preferential effect and it is not incompatible with the common market.54  
 
In accordance with this effect-based approach the Court has consistently held that an 
intervention made by governmental authorities which reduces a cost, normally carried by the 
companies is considered to be aid. On the other hand, the ECJ has also concluded that public 
                                                          
51 Beudenbacher, pp. 8-9 and Vedder p. 280. 
52 Case 310/85, Deufil v. Commission (Deufil), [1987] ECR 901, para. 8. 
53 Case 173/73, Italy v. Commission (Italian textiles), [1974] ECR 709.  
54 Beudenbacher, pp. 9-11; Evans, p. 39 and 1994 Guidelines  
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5.3.2 Aid granted by the State or through State resources 
 
The second element “aid granted by a member state or through state resources in any form 
whatsoever” is a statement of a very broad scope. The distinction made in the provision 
between “aid granted by the State” or aid granted “through State resources” does not signify 
that all advantages granted by the State is to constitute aid, it is merely intended to bring 
within the definition both advantages. The content of “aid granted by the State” can be read 
through the wording. The second part of the sentence “through state resources in any form 
whatsoever” is on the other hand more complex. This comprehends state measures transferred 
from the state to other parties and any measure whereby the state exerts its influence to confer 
an advantage on other parties without a transfer of public funds being necessary. State aid 
under Article 87(1) may therefore be granted through State institutions, agencies, State-owned 
private entities or even private undertakings. It is with other words not necessary that the aid 
is directly paid out of public funds, as long as the State plays a part in initiating or approving 
the aid and that the aid can be deduced from public resources. The ECJ stated in one case56 
where national rules permitted a lower salary then the minimum to be paid to foreign seamen, 
not to constitute State aid, even though the lower wages benefited the boat companies in that 
specific country. This since the advantage of the aid did not originate from State resources.57  
 
The Court did, however, in Preussen Elektra58, interpret the alternative contained in Article 
87(1) in a different matter. The case concerned the question of whether or not an obligation to 
purchase green electricity at a minimum price, higher than the economic value of the 
electricity was to be consider a state aid. This obligation was obviously conferring an 
advantage to the producers of renewable electricity, but the Court found that there was no aid 
due to the fact that no public funds were transferred. The Court did furthermore reject a 
                                                          
55 Case C-159/01 Koungariket Nederländerna mot Europeiska gemenskapernas kommission, Case 30/59, De 
Gezamenlijke Steenkolemijnen in Limburg mot höga myndigheten, Case C-200/97 Ecotrade. 
55 Case N 702/95 and N 175/96 Servola SpA. 
56 Cases C-72 and 73/91, Firma Sloma Neptun Schiffahrts AG v. Seebetriebsrat Bodo Ziesemer of Sloman 
Neptun Schiffahrts AG. 
57 Case C-379/98 Preussen Elektra AG v. Schleswag AG, point 58; Vedder p. 28 and Steiner, p. 288-89. 
58 Case C-379/98 Preussen-Elektra AG v. Schleswag AG. 
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proposal by the Commission to establish a useful effect rule for state aids. It simply refused to 
see that this obligation could be connected to a governmental reduction in the income of tax, 
and reductions or exemptions from taxation schemes do normally constitute state aid. Despite 
this judgement, Vedder says that this should not be taken to mean that Article 87(1) now has 
its wings clipped. He means that this judgement only shifted the focus from the question 
whether or not a transfer of public funds is necessary to the question of what constitute 
“public funds”. This could now be said to coincide to a large degree with what the state 
consist of, and the concept of state is very broad. Private as well as public bodies that are 
under the control of the state will therefore fall within the ambit of Article 87(1).59  
 
The State can in certain circumstances make use of independent private companies to carry 
out its activities. It is easy to prove the connection to the State in the cases where the agencies 
are acting as intermediaries to promote the States activities. In one preliminary ruling from the 
ECJ60 the Court had the opportunity to deal with this situation. The competent Federal office 
in the case levied a charge on imported citrus juice in order to finance the sale and export of 
its own countries agricultural products. The ECJ did in its judgement not distinguish between 
a State institution and an institution set up to grant aid, the important concern was whether aid 
had been provided out of State recourses, and it had. A more difficult situation is, however, 
when an undertaking is not directly financed by State resources but finances itself through 
means of compulsory contributions. The situation where a provider of State aid is 
incorporated under private law does, however, not mean that they are not bound by the 
prohibition under Article 87(1). It is not rare that the State has substantial shares in the capital 
of private banks. This can constitute an infringement of Article 87(1), if the State or its 
geographical entities use these credit institutions to grant certain companies particularly 
favourable interest rates. The ECJ found for example in Van der Kooy61 that preferential 
tariffs for gas charged by the private company constituted aid. This what with all certainty due 
to the fact that the authorities in the Netherlands held 50 per cent of the shares and had a 50 
per cent representation in the supervisory board together with the possibility for the 
authorities to veto tariff decisions. An interesting question appearing from this kind of 
judgements is, what amount of control that is required, for the funds administered by such 
private entity to constitute state resources.62 
                                                          
59 Vedder, pp. 281-284. 
60 ECR 1977, p. 585 – Steinike und Weinlig v. Germany 
61 Case 67/85, Kwekerij Gebroeders Van der Kooy et al. v. Commission , [1985] ECR 1315., point 33-37. 
62 Beudenbacher, pp. 16-17; Case C-379/98 Preussen-Elektra AG v. Schleswag AG and Vedder, pp. 281-284. 
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This issue was addressed in the “Family Allowances in the Textile Sector”63 ruling. The 
Italian government had in this case argued that the partial exemption of an industry from 
social contributions should not be regarded as State aid or aid granted through State resources, 
since the loss of the revenue was covered by the employer’s contributions to the 
unemployment insurance. The Court on the other hand, found that the funds were financed 
through compulsory contributions according to national law and that for this reason, such aid 
must be construed as state-financed even if the administration of the fund is assigned to non-
governmental bodies. Two important requirements may be distilled through this judgement. 
Firstly, in order to constitute state aid, the entity must be funded by compulsory contributions 
imposed by legislation and secondly, the management by the entity of the funds must also 
take place in accordance with the provisions of the legislation. The third requirement came 
later with the Commission v. France64 case and held that the grant of funds must be subject to 
approval by the public authorities. The conclusion that can be made from these cases are that 
even purely private funds can constitute state resources even though they are not actually 
collected by the state, if the three requirements above are fulfilled.65  
 
The conclusion of the text written above is that all these bodies are capable of giving State 
aid: geographical State entities such as provinces, regions, departments, associations of local 
authorities, and local authorities; corporations under public law, associations or other legal 
entities of public law; equalisation and support institutions set up by government order. This 
view is supported by both academic literature and case law, which agree that legal status, or 
the degree of freedom for self-determination granted to the institutions, are of no significance 
when determining State aid.66 
 
 
5.3.3 Distortion of competition 
 
The third element requires incompatible aid to threaten to distort or actually distort 
competition. The interpretation of distortion in Article 87(1) must, however, be interpreted 
differently from Article 81(1). This follows by the fact that Article 81(1) aims at controlling 
                                                          
63 Case 173/73, Italy v. Commission (Italian textiles), [1974] ECR 709, point 16.  
64 Case 290/83, Commission v. France, [1985] ECR 439, point 15.  
65 Beudenbacher, pp. 16-17 and Vedder, pp. 284-285. 
66 Beudenbacher, pp. 15-16. 
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the activities of private economic entities, whereas Article 87(1) sanctions State behaviour.67 
In the “Family Allowances in the Textile Sector” case the Court examined the concept of 
distortion in Article 87(1) by comparing the competitive situation before and after the state 
measures:68 
 
“[…] the point of departure must necessarily be the competitive position existing within the 
common market before the adoption of the measure in issue. This position is the result of 
numerous factors having varying effects on production costs in the different member states 
[…] unilateral modification of a particular factor of the cost of production in a given sector of 
the economy of a member state may have the effect of disturbing the existing equilibrium”. 
 
The character of incompatible State aid is therefore that it changes the process of competition 
and interferes with the competitive relation between undertakings or spheres of commercial 
activity by improving a specific undertakings’ competitiveness. That means that an aid given 
to a firm which as a result ends up in a better competitive position compared to its’ 
competitors, distorts competition, if the aid would not have been given under normal market 
conditions. The Court found in Ladbroke69 that the decision made by the French Minister to 
allow Pari Mutuel Urbain to defer payment of parts of the State’s shares of levies on bets 
taken on horse races gave the company a financial advantages towards its competitors, which 
did not enjoy the same the same right to procrastinate payments of levies. This action gave, 
according to the Court, the organisation an improved position on the market of bet taking both 
at home and abroad.70 
 
As in Article 81(1) the application of Article 87(1) does not require an actual distortion, a 
potential distortion is sufficient. It must be recalled that even small amounts of aid can be 
liable to affect the competition and trade between Member States, where there is a strong 
competition in which undertakings receiving that aid operates. Even though the court has 
taken this approach, the Commission has chosen to take a more generous route. It has issued a 
Notice on the de minimis rule for State aid in 1996 [1996] OJ C-68/9, which states that small 
amounts of aid will not foul the State aid rules.71  
                                                          
67 Beudenbacher, p. 22. 
68 Case 173/73, Italy v. Commission (Italian textiles), [1974] ECR 709, point 17.   
69 Case T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing v. Commission [1998] ECR II-1. 
70 Beudenbacher, p. 22. 
71 Case C-351/98, Vlaams Gewest v. Commission; Steiner, p. 289 and Beudenbacher, p. 22. 
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5.3.4 Support for particular undertakings or spheres of commercial activity 
 
The fourth element requires the aid to favour certain firms or the production of certain goods. 
This requirement is furthermore closely connected to the third element, that competition must 
be distorted, which is helpful in order to distinguish general measures from state aids. If the 
aid is not benefiting a selective group of undertakings or sphere of commercial activity it will 
not distort competition either.72  
 
The important point in this criteria is that the measures is directed to a particular undertaking, 
this means that measures favouring all undertakings in a Member State without any 
distinction and without any prejudice to competition is not unlawful according to Article 
87(1). The ban on aid is only meant to prevent a certain undertaking to get preferential 
treatment, not to regulate competition between Member States. Measures of general economic 
policy such as base rate reductions or currency devaluations to stimulate the national economy 
or export earnings are therefore not considered as unlawful aid in Article 87(1).73  
 
There is a distinction made between general measures and general aid schemes. General 
measures are not related to a specific branch of industry or a specific company and will 
therefore normally fall outside the scope of Article 87(1). In a similar way, aid schemes which 
do not involve any discretion in the administration, will not constitute unlawful aid. The ECJ 
stated the issue in the DMT case74: 
 
“It follows from the wording of Article 92(1) [Now Article 87(1)] of the Treaty that general 
measures which do not favour only certain undertakings or the production of only certain 
goods do not fall within that provision. By contrast, where the body granting financial 
assistance enjoys a degree of latitude which enables it to choose the beneficiaries or the 
conditions under which the financial assistance is provided, that assistance cannot be 
considered to be to general in nature”. 
 
                                                          
72 Vedder, pp. 292-295. 
73 Beudenbacher, pp. 18-20 
74 Case C-256/97, Déménagements-Manutention Transport SA (DMT), [1999] ECR I-3913, point 27. 
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The authority’s discretion to grant aid can therefore be seen as a major factor leading to this 
favouring effect, but this view is, however, questioned in the Adria-Wien case75. The ECJ 
considered here that it was state aid to favour certain sectors of industry by giving them tax 
benefits which other parts could not gain, even though there were objective criteria for the 
exemption which left no discretionary room for the authorities. In the cases where it does fall 
under the prohibition in Article 87(1), they will be assessed on their merits and may be 
authorised if they are; applied without discrimination as to the origin, do not exceed 100% of 
the environmental costs and do not conflict with other provisions of the Treaty. Aid to 
increase general environmental awareness is another measure that does not fall within Article 
87(1). Aid to repair past damages to the environment do on the other hand fall within the 
scope of Article 87(1) and do according to the new Guideline of 2001 constitute state aid, but 
these aspects will be further dealt with under the chapter of guidelines.76 
 
 
5.3.5 Effect on trade between Member States 
 
“When state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings 
competing in intra-community trade the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid.”77 
 
As can be seen from the Courts statement in the ruling above, the fifth element of state aid is 
that the measure must readily affect intra-community trade. Even though this requirement is 
theoretically important the Commission and the ECJ tent to regard it as being of secondary 
importance. The opinion is simply that the existence of a distortion of competition also 
implies an obstruction of inter-state trade.78  
 
The criteria of effect on trade between Member States are fulfilled if a measure makes it more 
difficult for another Member State to break into the national market. The circumstance that 
the aid receiver is not even active as an exporter or that the company exports almost its’ whole 
production outside the Community does not matter, it can still be regarded as affecting intra-
community trade. Aid of relatively small importance or the fact that the beneficiary is small or 
                                                          
75 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH, Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke GmbH v. 
Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, REG 2001 s. I-8365.  
76 Vedder, pp. 293-295; 1994 Guidelines and Jans, pp. 298-299. 
77 Case 730/79, Phillip Morris v. Commission, [1980] ECR 2671, point II. 
78 Beudenbacher, pp. 25-27. 
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that its’ part of the market is finite do not matter either. The ECJ has not adopted a de minimis 
rule with regard to Article 87 even though the Commission has.79 
 
 
5.4 The practical application of the State Aid regulation 
 
The Commission is responsible for the application of the state aid regulation. It can according 
to article 88(2) decide a return of state measures it finds incompatible with the common 
market, or if aid is abused , decide that the Member State in question shall annul or change 
its’ aid measures within a time limit. If the Member State does not follow its’ decision, it can 
assigned the issue straight to the ECJ. There is, however, a possibility for the Member State to 
appeal a Commission decision to the ECJ within two months.80  
 
Article 88(3) states an obligation for Member States to notify all new measures which it finds 
fulfil the provision in Article 87(1) and all changes of existing aid measures. The decision as 
to whether or not the measure affects trade between Member States and the question of 
authorisation is entirely a issue for the Commission. An authorised aid must furthermore have 
a legal support in the Commissions Guidelines.81 
 
 
Chapter 6: Exempted and exemptible aid - Article 87(2) and Article (3) 
 
6.1 Overview  
 
Sometimes aid may be lawful even if it obstructs and distorts competition between Member 
States. Article 87(2) contains aid permitted per se, whereas Article 87(3) permits aid systems 
which compatibility can be ensured by the Commission or by the Council. These aids are with 
other words considered to be compatible or may be considered compatible with the common 
market. Even though the main aspect of the EC Treaty is the maximisation of competition, 
other objects are considered and in some circumstances given preference. Article 81(3) for 
                                                          
79 Beudenbacher, pp. 25-27, Vedder, pp.295-296, se also chapter 5.3.3 about the Commission’s Notice on the de 
minimis rule for State aid in 1996 [1996] OJ C-68/9. 
80 SOU 2003:38, pp. 437-438. 
81 SOU 2003:38, pp. 437-438. See also the European Unions homepage 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen_stateaid_en-html 2003-11-29 
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example, permits certain restrictive agreements if the benefits achieved will exceed those 
which would result from undistorted competition. Article 86(2) permits a relief from the 
competition rules to public undertakings entrusted with tasks of general economic interest, if 
that is necessary to carry out the performance. With this background Article 87(2) and (3) can 
be seen as permitting aid which promotes Community objectives. The national interest of a 
Member State to obtain aid is, however, not sufficient. The Community’s general policy must 
gain positive advantages for the Commission to permit the aid.82  
 
The difference between the second paragraph and the third, is the fact that the Commission in 
the second paragraph is only authorised to decide whether or not the state measure falls within 
the wording of one of the three types of state aid mentioned there. There is no room for 
discretion. In paragraph three on the other hand the Commission has a wide margin of 
discretion in deciding whether or not one of the four exemptions listed there applies to a state 
aid scheme.83 Due to subject area of this paper, I will not go through the provision of Article 
87(2) in detail, the concentration will be on the exemption for aid having a social character, 
Article 87(2)(a), and aid granted to compensate the damages caused by natural disasters. For 
similar reasons I will only go through the “European interest exemption” in 87(3)(b) and 
sectoral aid exemption in 87(3)(c).   
 
 
6.2 Aid having a social character - Article 87(2)(a) 
 
Article 87(2)(a) consist of an exemption from the prohibition in 87(1), if the aid is of a social 
character. Vedder has interpreted the criteria of “social” to the fact that aid must be granted to 
individual consumers and not that it is intended to limit the scope of the aid measures. The 
purpose of the provision relates to the means of the aid more than the objectives of the 
national measures. The aid must furthermore have a specific effect to a certain group of 
consumers and be non-discriminating. It is also important that it, when given, do not result in 
an unequal treatment depending on the origin of the products. If it does, it will be considered 
as an infringement of Article 87(1). This exemption gives, either directly or indirectly a 
                                                          
82 Evans, pp. 107-110 and Beudenbacher, pp. 27-28. 
83 Case T-55/99, Plan Renove Industrial, [2000] ECR II-3207, point 109 & 110 and Evans, pp. 107-110 and 
Beudenbacher, pp. 27-28. 
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preferential effect to certain undertakings or certain goods, but this possible distortion of 
competition is accepted.84 
 
There is, however, little case law in regard to Article 87(2)(a). The Court could furthermore 
not in the only case85 regarding the article in a satisfactory way discuss the requirements, 
since the referring judge had neglected to provide the necessary details. Despite the lack of 
clear outlines for the use of Article 87(2)(a) in the Court’s case-law, the Commission has used 
the Article in many environmental cases. One of them is the German Catalytic converter case 
where a tax exemption for consumers who bought cars with catalytic converters was qualified 
under Article 87(2)(a), provided that it was not hindering the free movements of goods in 
Article 28 EC. 86  In the Commission’s 1994 Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental 
Protection it stated in paragraph 3.5 that measures that encourage the purchase of 
environmentally friendly products will not constitute aid in the first place, because they do not 
confer a “tangible financial benefit” upon one or more undertakings. 
 
 
6.3 Aid to compensate damages caused by natural disasters - Article 87(2)(b) 
 
It is clear that only damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances can fall 
within the scope of Article 87(2)(b). This means that also aid to prevent reoccurrence of 
natural disasters most probably will fall outside the provision. The importance of this Article 
is therefore limited and environmental considerations may even play a negative role in this 
respect. Some environmental damages, such as flooding is a result of human exposure in the 
nature. Excessive logging and the development of entire mountain ranges into ski slopes are 
examples of actions which will greatly reduce the capacity of these mountainsides to absorb 
water, thus increasing the risk of floods in downstream areas. This kind of damage would give 
right to aid under this provision, but in a justice and environmental protection respect these 
costs should be borne by the polluter. There is, however the Water Framework Directive87 
which can be helpful in this respect.88  
   
                                                          
84 Beudenbacher, pp. 27-29 and Vedder, p. 297. 
85 Case 52/76, Luigi Benedetti v. Munari Filli, [1977] ECR 163, point 19. 
86 Vedder, pp. 297-298.  
87 Directive 2000/60 Establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy. OJ 2000 
L327/1. 
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6.4 Aid for important projects of common European interest - Article 87(3)(b) 
 
This subparagraph of the article contains two completely different rationales for exemption, 
but the focus will only be on the first ground, aid granted “to promote the existence of an 
important project of common European interest”. The question of whether or not a project is 
to be considered as important involves a great deal of discretion and is therefore not really 
answerable. There are, however, documents which describe what a project of “common 
European interest” is.  The ECJ stated in Glaverbel89  
 
“that a project may not be described as being of common European interest for the purposes 
of Article 92(3)(b) [now Article 87(3)(b), JHJ] unless it forms part of a transnational 
European programme supported jointly by a number of governments of the Member States, or 
arises from concerted action by a number of Member States to combat a common threat…” 
 
This means that two or more Member States have to have a direct interest in the project in 
order for the aid to be permitted. Aid was therefore not permitted in the Glaverbel case - the 
connection between the aid and the improvement of the environmental situation through a 
transnational action did not immediately come clear. The Court said furthermore that common 
threat of this definition could also be environmental pollution. Projects to improve the energy 
supply; project to develop new industries; projects of basic research; the creation of new 
infrastructures; the establishment of telecommunications systems, sewage plants, dam 
construction, waste disposal plants etc are therefore all examples of projects that have been 
object for the exemption under Article 87(3)(b).90  
 
The possibility for permitting environmental aid under the “European interest” provision is 
nevertheless limited. The old guidelines for State aid, formulated by the Commission, 
concerned the application of the exemption in Article 87(3)(b). It gave the impression that it 
was difficult to achieve an exemption under this provision for any reason, but that it was 
virtually impossible to have environmental protection aid approved under Article 87(3)(b) 
when the criteria of “European interest” was not met. A further exemption was introduced in 
the Commissions IVth Competition Report. 91  It held that environmental aid could be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
88 Vedder, p. 299 and Beudenbacher, p. 29. 
89 Case 62/87, Glaverbel, [1988] ECR 1573. 
90 Beudenbacher, pp. 34-36 and Vedder, pp. 299-300. 
91 Point 182. 
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permitted in order to maintain international competition. This could be the case when a 
Member State has a higher environmental protection, such as the carbon dioxide taxation in 
Sweden. In the Swedish case companies suffer from higher production costs which will show 
in the price of the product and result in disadvantage on the international market. The 
“normal” ground of granting environmental aid is now, however, to be found in Article 
87(3)(c), since environmental aid under Article 87(3)(b) is today only granted in order to 
“promote the execution of important projects of common European interest which are of an 
environmental priority and will often have beneficial effects beyond the frontiers of the 
Member State or States concerned”.92  
 
 
Chapter 7: Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection 
   
7.1 Background 
 
The use of environmental subsidies increased in the European Union in the 1970’s and the 
Commission found it necessary to provide some guidance, as to its position on the role of 
environmental concerns in the rules on state aid. The Commission seems to always have done 
this from a twofold perspective of the polluter pays principle and the need to ensure 
undistorted competition. Its view for a solution to this problem, has been and still is, to apply 
the polluter pays principle fully and to completely internalise environmental costs. The fact is 
nevertheless that state aid overturns the internalisation. The Commission has thus recognised 
the importance of regional environmental aids from both an environmental and a competition 
point of view.93  
 
As a result of this development, the Commission set out its stands with regard to 
environmental subsidies in nine paragraphs in the Fourth Annual Competition Report 1971.94 
With too much optimism the Commission believed in a fully internalised polluter pays 
principle and a completely internalisation of environmental costs to be completed in a 
transitional period of six years. This state aid policy was going to distinguish between two 
different stands. The Commission had one view in regard to environmental aid during the 
                                                          
92 Jans, pp.  300-306. 
93 Commission Ivth, Competition Report (1974) para. 176 and Vedder p. 176. 
94 Commission, IVth. Competition Report (1974) point 176-183. 
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transitional period and one policy for aid granted after or during the transitional period which 
did not fulfil the requirements. State aid during the transitional period had to qualify under 
Article 87(3)(b), as aid necessary for the execution of “important projects of common 
European interest”. It furthermore had to fulfil the three following requirements: 
 
1) It had to be necessary for new major obligations relating to environmental protection. 
2) It had to be granted for the financing of additional investments in plants already in 
operation. 
3) It had to be of a specified degressive maximum aid percentage set by the Commission. 
 
For environmental aid which exceeded the limits set out above, the Commission decided that 
they were only going to be granted in cases where sudden major changes in environmental 
obligations would create difficulties for the equilibrium in a certain region or industry. It 
created with other words an exception to the strict rules of aid in situations where 
international competition could be seriously handicapped due to new environmental 
standards. This framework was, however, actually only defined for the assessment of 
environmental investment aid and operating aid came therefore to fall outside the scope of 
these guidelines.95  
 
The Commission realised in 1980 that it’s’ goal to implement the polluter pays principle in six 
years was proven to be overly optimistic and an additional transitional period was therefore 
given for this assessment. Environmental aid was therefore allowed for another six year 
period. This kind of aid exempted under Article 87(3)(b), investment aid, was only granted for 
the adaptation of plants in operation for two years before the entry into force of the new 
standards and did not exceed 15%. A reporting obligation was furthermore introduced, but the 
Commission continued to remain silent with regard to environmental operating aids.96  
 
In 1986 the Commission finally saw that its’ transitional approach was not going to happen. 
The need for environmental protection as well as the protection of the competition was there 
to stay. The Commission therefore decided that the 1980’s Guideline was going to apply for 
                                                          
95 Vedder, pp. 301-302. 
96 Commission, Xth. Competition Report (1980), point 24 and 26, and Vedder p. 302. 
 35
the period of the fourth Environmental Action Programme until 1992. It was first in 1994 a 
new Guideline for environmental aid emerged.97  
 
The largest difference between the 1994 Guidelines and the previous ones was the character. 
The 1994 Guidelines was in comparison much more comprehensive, more precise and there 
were for the first time rules governing operating aids and horizontal measures. The Guidelines 
distinguished primarily the following forms of environmental aid: 
 
1) Aid for investment 
2) Aid for increasing environmental awareness 
3) Operating aid 
 
The legal basis for the granting of environmental aid changed from Article 87(3)(b) into 
Article 87(3)(c), “aid to facilitate the development of certain activities […] where such aid 
does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest”. 
The Commission furthermore allowed state aid schemes under Article 87(3)(b) at higher rates 
in order to contribute to important projects of common European interest. A review of the 
1994 Guidelines occurred in 1996, but no changes were made. Many expirations later it came 
to end first the 31th of December 2000.98  
 
In 1998 the Council adopted Regulation 994/9899 which gave the Commission the right to 
adopt block exemption regulations in the field of state aids. There is even an explicit rule 
which allows for a Commission block exemption regulation for state aid in the field of 
environmental protection.100 Despite of this development a new edition of the Guidelines were 
issued in February 2001 and not a block exemption regulation. Vedder argues that this might 
depend on the fact that environmental protection is constantly giving us new challenges. An 
example is the carbon dioxide reductions in the Kyoto protocol. Climate change was largely 
unknown 1994, whereas it today is on of the largest issues in environmental protection. In this 
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98 Vedder, p. 303 and Jans, pp. 301-302. 
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7.2 The 2001 Environmental aid Guidelines 
 
Once again the new guidelines came to be even more precise and to comprise a larger 
perspective of aid than the last ones. The 2001 Environmental aid Guidelines came to be a 11 
chapter, twelve pages and one annex long guidance for the granting of environmental aid. I 
will in the following text go through the Guidelines chapter by chapter.  
 
 
7.2.1 Introductory chapters 
 
In the first chapter of the Guidelines, chapter A, the two main principles of environmental aids 
are set out. The integration principle in Article 6 and the polluter pays principle. In the 
evaluation of the fifth environmental action program it was noted that it was clear that 
damages to the environment gave costs to the society. Environmental protection can in the 
light of this generate benefits in the form of economic growth, employment and 
competitiveness, but it is still hard to implement the full application of the polluter pays 
principle. It is also important to remember that aid is actually against the polluter pays 
principle. What the Guidelines are trying to inform, is that aid can nevertheless be justified in 
two circumstances: 
 
1) When there are no other solutions. The costs can not be fully internalised and aid therefore 
represents a temporary second-best solution which can provide an incentive for firms to 
adopt environmental standards. 
2) Where aid can be used as incentive for companies to improve on standards or to go 
beyond what is required by them.102 
 
This is a significant change from the 1994 Guidelines, where aid was granted in order to 
facilitate for firms to comply with compulsory standards. This is, however, not permitted 
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anymore with the exception for SMEs.103 Another new aspect the Guidelines introduced was 
that state aid was only going to be permitted when it is:104 
 
“[…] necessary to ensure environmental protection and sustainable development without 
having disproportionate effects on competition and economic growth”. 
 
The content of this statement is, first of all, that the competition on the market shall be 
ensured together with the completion of the single market and the increased competitiveness 
in the firms and secondly, that the environmental protection shall be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of competition policy, especially to promote sustainable 
development but also in order to internalise environmental costs.105  
 
The Commission devoted a special paragraph in regard to the energy sector. In this part 
special attention is given to the problem of exemptions or reductions in eco-taxation schemes. 
They are regarded as operating aid but may nevertheless be considered necessary for the 
acceptability and thus adoption or continuation of eco-taxation schemes. This kind of 
reduction or exemption may be allowed for a period of 10 years. The Commission also stated 
its reiterated positive stance for measures to promote renewable energy and the combined 
production of heat and energy.106  
 
The definitions and the scope of the Guidelines are set out in chapter B. A number of changes 
have been introduced. Aid for environmental training for example fell within the scope of the 
1994 Guidelines, whereas the 2001 Guidelines do not consider the measure as aid at all. The 
scope of the 2001 Guidelines regards furthermore aid in all areas covered by the EC Treaty 
which protects the environment. This includes all sectors, but excludes the field covered by 
the Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector. State aid for research and 
development in the environmental sector is another area which is not covered by these 
Guidelines, but in the Community framework for State aid for research and development.107  
 
                                                          
103 1994 Guidelines, point 2.3 A and 2001 Guidelines, point 20. 
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106 2001 Guidelines, point 22-24. 
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The general conditions for the granting of environmental aid are put down in chapter E. As in 
the 1994 Guidelines, the Commission has divided its policy in three areas: investment aid, aid 
for horizontal measures and operating aid. 
 
 
7.2.2 Investment aid      
 
Investment aid is regulated under paragraph E.1 in the Guidelines. The notion of “eligible 
costs” seems to be particularly important due to the fact that investment aid is described as a 
percentage of these costs.  According to paragraph 37 in the Guidelines, eligible costs, are 
extra investments costs necessary to reach the environmental goals. With regard to renewable 
energy, eligible costs are those extra costs compared to the situation where it would have used 
conventionally produced energy. In the situation where no standards exists, eligible costs are 
considered to be investment costs necessary to achieve a higher level of environmental 
protection than the firm could have achieved without any environmental aid. Benefits coming 
from this extra investment, such as increased production capacity, will nevertheless have to be 
detracted from the eligible costs. These investments must furthermore lead to actual 
improvements in the environmental performance, i.e. go beyond what is provided by 
Community standards and not just constitute general investments that any responsible 
company should do. In Hoffman-La Roche108 the Commission considered aid in order to 
combat water and air pollution to be justified on the basis of the Guidelines, whereas the 
measures granted with a view of reducing the risk of a serious accident  was considered as 
general measures.109  
 






                                                          
108 Commission Decision 98/251, Hoffman-La Roche (Orlistat), OJ 1998 L 103/28. 
109 Commission Decision 98/251, Hoffman-La Roche (Orlistat), OJ 1998 L 103/28, pp. 33-35 and 2001 
Guidelines, point 37. 
110 The table is taken from Vedder, p. 307. 
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Type of aid Basic rate  Bonus Special remarks 
Adaptation of SMEs 
to new standards 
15%  Only for three years 
following adoption of 
new standards 
- Improve on 
Community 
standards 










30% +10% for SMEs  
Energy saving 
measures 
40% +10% for SMEs  
Combined production 
of heat and electricity 
40% +10% for SMEs  
Promotion of 
renewable sources of 
energy 
40% +10% when they 
serve the needs of an 
entire Community 
+10% for SMEs 
Up to 100% can 
allowed in which case 
no further aid may be 
granted 
Land rehabilitation  100%, plus 15% of 
the cost of the work 
 If identifiable and 
able to bear the costs, 
the polluter should 
pay and no aid may 
be granted 
Relocation of firms 30% 10% for SMEs - Only when 
relocating from 
an urban area or 
Natura 2000 
where the activity 
was lawfully 
carried out, 
- The relocation 
was ordered by a 
public authority 
on environmental 
grounds, and the 
strictest standards 





As can be seen in this table, SMEs are permitted aid under the Guidelines for the adoption of 
new mandatory standards. The 1994 guidelines permitted this kind of aid to all undertakings, 
but the new one from 2001 changed the rules. Aid for this purpose is now only permitted for 
SMEs for a period of three years. This aid can furthermore only be granted up to the level of 
15% of the eligible cost. There is, however, a problem arising from this authorisation. Most 
Community environmental legislations are in the form of directives, which means that they 
need to be implemented in order to apply in the Member States. SMEs can therefore receive 
aid for the adoption of rules that might not have been transposed into national law or rules that 
have not even entered into force. Another aspect, is that this actually requires the SMEs to pay 
attention to the activities in Brussels, which they due to their size might not be suited for.111  
 
Another interesting aspect is the favourable position of energy related installations which 
most certainly has its background to the Kyoto protocol. It is, however, only renewable 
energy installations that serve the need of an entire community which qualify for an extra 10 
per cent bonus. Finally, these Guidelines of 2001 contains clear and relatively unambiguous 
guidance in the cases concerning land rehabilitation and plant relocation, which is a step 
forward compared to the case-by-case approach under the 1994 guidelines. The Commission 
did not find that measures for rehabilitation for pollution where the polluter could not be 
found to constitute aid in the old guidelines, whereas it is today. There is, however, not a 
significant difference due to the fact that the Commission allows 100 per cent of the eligible 
costs plus 15 per cent of the cost of the work to be funded. The change of wording in the 
Guidelines can therefore be said to only have given a procedural difference, since the aid will 
most certainly be authorised. Of larger importance is however the fact that the Commission 
leaves the decision as to whether or not persons are responsible for the pollution, to the 
national legislature and judiciary. This discretion can lead to serious distortion of competition 
and differences in regimes according to which polluters can be held responsible. The 
investment aid guidelines have nevertheless become much clearer, especially in relation to the 
energy related investment where the 1994 Guidelines treated the question under the category 
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7.2.3 Aid for horizontal measures 
 
Aid for horizontal measures was as a basic approach not considered as aid under the 1994 
Guidelines, but this view has changed. The chapter has therefore become more substantially 
concise in the Guidelines of 2001. Even though the guidelines have narrowed the breadth of 
this chapter it still treats the SMEs in a favourable way. The Commission seems to be of the 
view that “advisory/consultancy services play an important part in helping SMEs to make 
progress in environmental protection”112  and they may therefore be granted aid in accordance 
with Regulation 70/2001 in order to stay up with to date with the environmental developments 
in Europe.113  
 
 
7.2.4 Operating aid   
  
Even though there have been a progress in the environmental area for reducing pollution and 
in introducing cleaner technologies, there are still many costs for activities which damage the 
environment that are not passed on to the product. Member States have tried to handle that 
situation through internalising some of these costs and benefits through taxes or through 
charges for environmental services, on the one hand, and through subsidies, on the other. 
Cost-related charges for environmental services, such as taxes and charges, are in line with 
the polluter pays principle, but it may nevertheless be necessary to delay the full charging, this 
due to the competition under the transition time, since many firms can simply not stand this 
new financial burden and will need a temporarily relief in order to survive and compete with 
other firms which governments do not have such measures. This kind of relief is operating 
aid.114 
 
The Guidelines distinguish between two different kinds of operating aid, one which concerns 
the waste management and energy saving and the other which regulate any aid in the form of 
tax reductions or exemptions. The Commission first deals with operating aid for waste 
management and energy saving, which is only permitted where it is shown to be absolutely 
necessary. It should furthermore be strictly limited to the compensation for extra production 
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costs and the aid must be temporarily and as a general rule degressive. Sometimes temporarily 
relief from environmental taxes can nevertheless be permitted under these provisions, if it is 
necessary to offset losses in competitiveness, particularly at international level. This is for 
example the case for operating aid for the management of industrial waste where aid is 
authorised if there are no harmonisation or if there are stricter national rules. Aid will in that 
case be permitted for five years maximum and to be either degressive or non-degressive.115 
 
It has been hard for firms of renewable energy sources to compete effectively with the 
conventional produced energy and it is therefore possible under these guidelines to achieve 
operating aid. The first option of receiving operating aid comes from the difference between 
the production cost of renewable energy and the market price of the form of power concerned. 
The second alternative concerns the use of biomass, which is a renewable source of energy 
which requires relatively little investment but brings higher operating costs. If the Member 
States can show that the aggregate cost after plant depreciation is till higher than the market 
prices of energy, the Commission will consider permitting aid. Aid is in the third case actually 
not given because of the need of it, rather as a bonus. Operating aid will in this situation be 
the difference between what external costs that has been avoided through the use of this 
energy production way compared to a plant operating with conventional forms of energy. 
Besides these alternatives Member States may also grant operating aid in accordance with the 
general rules governing aid. The Commission finds furthermore that operating aid is justified 
for the combined production of electric power and heat, if the obligations for the same area 
required for investment aid are fulfilled. This kind of aid is granted to firms which distribute 
electric power and heat to the public, where the costs of producing such electric power or heat 
exceed its market price.116 
 
The second form of operating aid concerns tax reductions or exemptions and the Commission 
have been confronted with many eco-taxation schemes since the adoption of the 1994 
Guidelines. This experience has now been put down in the Guidelines of 2001. When 
Member States of environmental protection decides to adopt taxes for some certain activities, 
they may deem it, as mentioned above, necessary to give some firms temporarily exemption, 
especially when there are no harmonisation on the Community level or since some firms 
might risk to loose international competitiveness. The rules in the guideline separate two 
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different kinds of aid in the form of taxes or exemptions; tax levied as a result of Community 
directive and a new tax introduced by the Member State. Two situations can furthermore 
appear if a tax is levied due to a Community directive. The first situation is when the Member 
State applies a tax higher then the minimum rate required by the Community, but makes an 
exemption by letting some firms pay less, but the tax is nevertheless at least equal with the 
minimum rate set be the directive. This kind of aid might be justified in the Commission 
opinion, since the higher taxation makes it possible for the firms to adopt higher 
environmental protection in order to reduce the tax and that will influence companies to act in 
a more environmental friendly way. The second situation is when the Member State uses the 
minimum taxation rate laid down in the directive, but then grants an exemption to certain 
companies. In that case, these firms do not even pay the minimum rate required by the 
Community. If this kind of exemption is not authorised according to the directive in question, 
it is incompatible with Article 87(1). On the other hand, if it is permitted, the Commission has 
to decide if it is in line with Article 87(1) and if it is necessary and not disproportional in the 
light of Community objectives pursued. If an exemption is made, it must be strictly limited in 
time.117 
 
These strict guidelines have [its] their background in the Commission’s wish to ascertain that 
the reductions do not undermine the objectives of the schemes. A number of criteria’s must 
therefore be satisfied before such operating aid may be granted.  
 
 
7.3 State aid regulation and the Swedish energy taxation scheme 
 
The Swedish energy- and carbon dioxide taxation scheme is considered as State aid. It fulfils 
all the requirements in Article 87(1). The tax relief is granted by the State and the benefit is 
only given to some sectors of the industry. The beneficiaries are furthermore companies 
which are active on a product market which involve inter-state trade. The measure can 
therefore distort competition. The tax relief has nevertheless been authorised by the 
Commission at several different occasions as environmental aid.118  
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The Swedish government has once again noticed the Commission for the authorisation of the 
energy taxation scheme. The Commission has in its proceedings dealt with three different 
taxes, i.e. the carbon dioxide tax, tax on fossil fuels and tax on electricity. It did, however, 
consider that there was a strong connection between the carbon dioxide tax and the tax on 
fossil fuels and there are therefore examined together. There are, as mentioned earlier, three 
exceptions concerning the carbon dioxide taxation scheme.119 A general relief of 25 % for the 
manufacturing sector, the 0, 8 per cent rule and the 1, 2 per cent rule. There are furthermore a 
total relief for the manufacturing sector in regard to national tax on fossil fuels and 
electricity.120 
 
The carbon dioxide relief as well as the total relief of tax on fossil fuels for the manufacturing 
sector were both considered as measures which had a considerable positive effect on 
environmental protection, which are required for operating aid to be granted according to 
point 51.1 in the 2001 Guidelines. It is furthermore thought to contribute to the national goal 
to reduce the carbon dioxide by 22, 5% 2010.121  
 
Fuel Share of carbon 
dioxide tax paid 
Share of fossil fuel 
tax paid 
Share of total tax paid 
2003 
Oil 25 % 0 % 19 % 
Natural gas 25 % 0 % 22 % 
LPG 25 % 0 % 24 % 
Coal/Coke 25 % 0 % 22 % 
 
The Council directive 92/82/EEG122 sets out a tax for mineral oils whereas the Swedish 
taxation scheme gives the manufacturing sector a total relief from taxation of fossil fuels. This 
taxation scheme is, however, examined together with the carbon dioxide tax and a minimum 
tax of 19 % is therefore still paid. The requirement that minimum Community tax must be 
paid in point 51.1 b are therefore fulfilled. The other requirement in this point, i.e. that a 
considerable part of the national tax must be paid, here 22 %, is also accomplished according 
to the Commission. It is furthermore required in point 51.2 b in the 2001 Guidelines that the 
tax exemptions where decided before the tax came in force. The exemptions in this case were 
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made before Sweden’s entrance into the European Union 1995 and the requirement is 
therefore fulfilled. The Commission therefore stated in its partial decision the 11th December 
2002 once again that this scheme was to consider as state aid compatible with Article 
87(3)(c). The total taxation relief for electricity for the manufacturing sector is on the other 
hand under investigation.   
 
 
7.4 The role of environmental considerations in other sectors and guidelines 
 
As stated in chapter K of the Guidelines the Commission considers itself under an obligation 
to integrate environmental considerations into other guidelines and frameworks as well. This 
kind of action has been taken even before the 2001 Environmental Guidelines, for example in 
the Community Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector from 2000 where a whole 
chapter was devoted to environmental aid.123  
 
The Agriculture aid Guidelines contain a similar “integration-provision” to what can be found 
in the 2001 Environmental Guidelines. The Commission cites Article 6 in section 3.9 to come 
to the conclusion that it covers both the competition as well as the agricultural policy of the 
Community. It is furthermore on the basis of this which the Commission requires particular 
attention to be given to environmental issues, even in cases where the aid schemes are not 
specifically concerned with that subject. What is important, however, is to show that the 
effects of certain aid schemes do not run counter to Community Environmental protection 
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The question in focus has been whether or not there has been an integration of environmental 
concern in EC State aid regulation and also to what extent. I will in the following parts of the 
dissertation summarise the content as well as making an analysis of the information that have 
been discussed. 
 
Environmental law is compared to other areas of legislation very new but it has, however, 
been given more space during the years that have passed. The development has also given rise 
to stricter environmental standards, which in its turn have been negative for competition. 
Environmental legislation is furthermore often implemented on a national level, which means 
that strict environmental regulation will affect international competition.125  
 
The ECJ has in many situations stated that the Competition rules of the EC Treaty have to be 
interpreted in the light of two provisions, i.e. the aim to create a market with undistorted 
competition as held in Article 3(1)(g) and according to the objectives in Article 2. No specific 
definition of undistorted competition is nevertheless to be found in the Treaty. The 
Commission and the Court have, however, defined this concept to mean an “effective” or 
“workable” competition.126  
 
“The requirement that contained in Article 3 and 85 of the EEC Treaty [Now Articles 3(1)(g) 
and 81 EC] that competition shall not be distorted implies that existence on the market of 
WORKABLE COMPETITION, that is to say the degree of competition necessary to ensure 
the observance of the basic requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, in 
particular the creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a domestic 
market.”[Emphasis added]127 
 
This term of “workable competition” is, however, not so well defined as it appears to be here 
and too much weight should not be put on this statement. It is nevertheless interesting and 
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may at least give some guidance to how to distinguish a distorted market. The conclusion 
drawn from this description is that there is an obligation to maintain an effective or workable 
competition. That does, however, not mean that every restriction is forbidden and that is 
where environmental considerations come into the picture. I think that this statement, even 
though it was made for the implementation of Article 81, can be applied to the concept of 
competition in Article 87. 
  
The aim of the integration is quite simply to find a balance between competition and 
environmental protection in order to reach the goal of sustainable development. The problem 
has been to find that model where weight is given to both areas. It has furthermore been a 
question of what tools to use. Should the governments use the command and control 
instruments, the market tools or try to find a way to internalise the costs in the products? 
Competition regulation have always been seen as the villain to environmental considerations, 
and that also in regard to the State aid regulation, but it is not that simple. Aid is not always 
good for the environment as pointed out in Chapter 4 and it may in some circumstances even 
be negative for environmental protection. It can for example take away the incentive for 
undertakings to find better ways of production.  
 
 
8.2 Summary of the State Aid regulation  
 
At first sight the State aid regulation seem to be very strict. The wording of the provision 
seems to cover all benefits that can be deduced from the State. The Preussen Elektra case has 
probably changed this opinion, even if Vedder do not think that that means that Article 87 has 
had its’ wings clipped. That judgement did, however, benefit environmental protection, in that 
sense that Member States are now allowed to introduce regulation that forces private 
undertakings to buy environmental friendly electricity from renewable energy producers. This 
measure will probably also encourage more producers to produce environmental friendly 
energy, due to the fact that there are profits to gain in the system. Article 87(2)(a), aid having 
a social character, does in my opinion also benefit the environmental protection. As 
mentioned earlier, the Commission permitted a tax exemption in the German Catalytic 
converter case which gained consumers who chose to buy cars with catalytic converters, i.e. 
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cars that were more environmental friendly. 128  The environmental benefit from Article 
87(2)(b) can on the other hand be questioned. The purpose is to grant aid to compensate 
damages caused by natural disasters, but as mentioned before, these disasters can be a result 
from the exploitation of nature by humans.  
 
It can in my opinion not be questioned that environmental considerations have been taken into 
account in the State aid regulations, due to the Guidelines of Environmental aid. The purpose 
of some of these directions can on the other hand be confusing. It is not always clear why aid 
can be permitted, since there are in some circumstances no visible extra costs that struck 
companies for a production in a more environmental friendly way. One of those situations are 
the guidelines for operating aid for energy saving. Energy saving would generally involve 
measures targeting the loss of energy during a process or measures aimed at making the whole 
process more energy efficient. These measures would according to Vedder “pay themselves 
back” due to the lower energy consumption. Investment aid can in this respect be seen as 
necessary, but operating aid is a totally different story. What would the higher operating costs 
from a more efficient installation come from? 129  There is furthermore a possibility for 
industries to receive aid for the amount of costs that the more environmental friendly 
production has spared the Community in form of external costs, even though there are no 
extra costs for the firms. This measure can on the other hand be seen to encourage firms to 
stake on the production of renewable energy instead of using conventional methods. Another 
aspects that attract attention is the possibility for SMEs to receive aid for rules that are not yet 
adopted or in force. There is furthermore a danger of leaving the decision to whom to consider 
as a polluter to the Member States, which may if anything give rise to different interpretations 
and distort competition.  
 
There have also been good guidelines, one is for example the possibility for SMEs to receive 
aid for advisory/consultancy services in order to stay up to date with the environmental 
developments in Europe. Another is the change made under the 2001 Guidelines which states 
that only SMEs can qualify for investment aid in order to adapt to compulsory Community 
standards, whereas larger companies could qualify as well under the 1994 guidelines. This 
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change shows that the Commission has taken a new approach to environmental aid and is 
working towards an internalisation of environmental costs.130  
 
The Swedish energy taxation scheme is on the other hand an example of an assessment which 
is not fully internalising environmental costs in the product. The carbon dioxide tax and the 
tax on fossil fuels have been introduced to the market with the aim to reduce the emissions of 
carbon dioxide, but in the same time the most energy efficient companies are relieved from a 
full taxation. This is a measure which the Commission authorises as environmental aid 
compatible with the common market, even though the exemption itself does not benefit the 
environment. The aid is on competition grounds and not environmental. The total tax 
exemption for manufacturing companies were on the other hand not authorised by the 
Commission on the ground that it did not fulfil the requirements in point 51.1. b in the 2001 
Guidelines, i.e. that a considerable amount of the national tax were paid. The justification 
seems to be that an environmental taxation with partial exemptions is better then no taxation 
at all.   
 
 
8.3 An obligation to not fund environmentally damaging projects? 
 
The last chapter of the 2001 Environmental aid Guidelines refers to the integration principle 
and gives as a result an obligation for the Commission to integrate environmental concerns 
into its state aids policy in every sector. A similar provision can as mentioned earlier be found 
in the Agricultural aid Guidelines. The Commission states furthermore in both guidelines that 
notifications “should in the future contain an assessment of the expected environmental 
impact of the activity aided”.131 This gives, according to Vedder, rise to a more general 
question in how far environmental considerations may play a negative role in the process of 
the application of the state aid rules. As he puts it:  
 
“to what extent can a negative environmental impact assessment […] actually allow or even 
oblige the Commission to declare the aid incompatible with common market even though 
from a competition perspective there are no objections?”132 
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section 3.9. 
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Article 87 do at first sight not appear to allow for such negative role, but in the same time we 
have also seen that Article 6 puts the Commission under an obligation to at least consider the 
environmental impact on the decisions it takes. The first step to answer this question comes 
from the criterion that state aid is incompatible with the common market. The objectives of 
Article 87 is to bring about and maintain the common market, but a common market does not 
exist where there are only an area with free movement but together with a number of well-
defined environmental objectives as can be seen in Articles 2 and 3 EC. This thought seems to 
have underlined the Commissions statements in the Agriculture aid Guidelines where it held 
that: 
 
“All environmental aid schemes in the agricultural sector should be compatible with the 
objectives of Community environmental policy. In particular, aid schemes which fail to give 
sufficient priority to the elimination of pollution at source, or to the correct application of the 
polluter pays principle cannot considered compatible with the common interest, and therefore 
cannot be authorised by the Commission”133 
 
This statement is largely qualified by the fact that it applies to environmental aid schemes 
only. The fact that it refers to the common interest is, however, powerful. This statement is 
therefore clearly capable of being applied outside the agricultural sector and with regard to all 
aids, but a similar statement was nevertheless not incorporated into the 2001 Guidelines. It is, 
however, submitted that the Commission has the possibility to refuse authorisation of aid 
schemes that run counter to Community environmental protection requirements in general, 
just as it considers itself under an obligation to not fund environmentally damaging projects 
with Community funds.134 
 
 
8.4 Integration?  
 
Vedder argues that environmental considerations have more or less played a modest role with 
regard to nearly every provision of Community competition law.  The question is, however, if 
this more or less modest role has lead to an integration of environmental concerns in EC State 
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aid regulation. It is in order to answer this question, important to remember the fact that an 
integration requires both environmental and competition considerations to be taken into 
account. A conclusion based on my earlier discussion.135   
 
Is integration the way to make both environmental protection and competition law function in 
the best possible way for their individual aims? Probably not. The best way of protecting the 
environment would be to return to the early hominid way of life and the best competition 
conditions would be gained from a policy which promote unmitigated economic growth and 
financial profit. Neither of these alternatives would function in today’s society and neither 
would promote the search of sustainable development. The difficulty is therefore to find a 
relationship between these two areas where they are both working towards the same goal – 
sustainable development. The environment has to take some damages and the authorities have 
to accept that competition can be hindered in some circumstances. Competition law allows, as 
mentioned above, restrictions or distortions of competition insofar as they are necessary to 
bring about the internalisation of environmental costs. The only way for competition law to 
really contribute to the objective of achieving sustainable development and an integration is 
therefore to make environmental friendly product compete with other products.136   
 
What exactly does this integration required by Article 6 EC mean? A strictly legal reasoning 
can not provide an answer to this question, but it can on the other hand be answered through 
the discovery of the concepts of external costs and internalisation of external costs. The first 
term regards the situations where environmental costs have not been taken into account in the 
decisions made be economic actors. The second term, internalisation of economic costs, is 
that environmental degradation is a quantifiable costs for the polluter just as any other product 
cost. Internalisation of environmental costs includes the danger for the company in terms of 
consumers switching to competitors if the price of the product rises. A successful 
internalisation of environmental costs therefore depends more on changing consumers’ 
preferences rather than producers’ preferences, since a certain number of consumers may be 
willing to bear these extra costs, others not. There is today not a fully integrated market and it 
depends on consumers as well as governments. An internalisation of environmental costs 
could for example be possible if all States had the same environmental protection, but that is 
not the case. The Swedish energy taxations scheme is a good example of this. The Swedish 
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companies would suffer from loss in competitiveness without these tax reliefs since many 
firms from countries do not have this regulation.  
 
An interesting aspect of this whole complex mass of interrelated problem is that the Swedish 
government actually finds it strenuous that their energy measures are considered as state aid, 
even though it is compatible state aid under Article 87(3)(c). The point is that, as long as the 
measures falls under the provisions of Article 87(1), all changes of significant value has to be 
notified to the Commission, which means a decreased flexibility. It is therefore the Swedish 
government now is making plans for a new energy taxation scheme which cannot be 





So, have environmental considerations been taken into account with regard to the State aid 
regulation?  There are actually no legal arguments for the Court and the Commission to take 
environmental considerations into account in applying the competition rules addressed at 
Member States. There are for example no references to environmental considerations in 
Article 87(3) EC, but that has nevertheless not kept the Commission from exempting state 
aids on exclusively environmental grounds. The Commission seems furthermore to be more 
lenient for environmental justifications brought forward by Member States, compared to its’ 
approach to environmental considerations forwarded by undertakings. The different treatment 
is probably due the Commissions perception of environmental policy. According to this 
approach environmental policy is to be conducted by Member States authorities and not 
primarily the matter of private companies.   
 
The role of environmental concerns in EC competition law therefore differs widely between 
the various provisions. Vedder is of the opinion that environmental considerations have been 
taken with regard to Article 87 and environmental aid. He argues this position firstly by 
saying that these concerns can allow for an exemption on the basis of Article 87(3)(c). 
Secondly, that the Commissions practise concerning operating aid is clearly aimed at bringing 
about an internalisation, by recognising that some compensations may be necessary in order 
to make the internalisation process acceptable in the first place, but also by limiting the 
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duration of the compensation. Thirdly, environmental benefits can themselves warrant an 
exemption. More stringent national rules almost always give right to an exemption and 
therefore a right to aid.  
 
Does this mean that environmental considerations are always taken into account in the State 
aid regulation? Maybe not. There are environmental considerations in the regulation, but I 
think the considerations are limited to those environmental issues that are considered as most 
important today. Such areas are for example the climate change and the Kyoto protocol. The 
objectives of European environmental law is listed in the first paragraph of Article 174 and it 
refers to the preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting 
human health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources and promoting measures at 
international level to deal with regional or world-wide environmental problems. These 
objectives are the same as the ones stipulated in the sixth Environmental action program, 
which aim is to contribute to a global reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases, to work 
towards a high quality of life as well as to improve resource efficiency in order to spare 
natural resources. I therefore suspect that other environmental considerations besides the ones 
regarding climate change are somewhat neglected. Support for this opinion might be found in   
the increased amount of aid granted to the energy sector, whether in support of energy saving 
or to promote the use of new or renewable sources of energy.138     
 
Despite some uncertainties, I believe that environmental considerations are to an ever 
increasing extent being integrated into the EC state aid regulation.  
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